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One Health is an effective approach for the management of zoonotic disease in humans, animals and
environments. Examples of the management of bacterial zoonoses in Europe and across the globe
demonstrate that One Health approaches of international surveillance, information-sharing and appro-
priate intervention methods are required to successfully prevent and control disease outbreaks in both
endemic and non-endemic regions. Additionally, a One Health approach enables effective preparation
and response to bioterrorism threats.
© 2018 Published by Elsevier Masson SAS on behalf of Institut Pasteur.1. Introduction
Six in ten human cases of infectious disease arise from animal
transmission [1]. These so-called “zoonotic” pathogens, trans-
mitted to humans from animals, are found globally. Wherever
humans live, in both urban and rural settings, disease transmission
from animals can occur [2]. The relevance of zoonoses to human
health has been particularly highlighted by recent highly virulent
infections that threatened to become pandemic, with the potential
for high mortality. Such incidents include the 2005 H5/N1 avian
influenza outbreak, the 2009 “swine flu” H1/N1 influenza
pandemic, and the 2013e2016 West African Ebola outbreak [3,4].
Although zoonotic viruses were responsible for these incidents,
bacteria and parasites also pose threats for wide-spread zoonotic
incidents [5].Whilst lacking the global systemic threat of some viral
zoonoses, these ‘forgotten neglected zoonoses’ have more frequent
local outbreaks that can have significant consequences [6].
The 2005 H5/N1 avian influenza outbreak was the first zoonotic
epidemic with high threat potential to unite global bodies in a
network to address the threat of zoonoses [3]. The recognition of
this zoonotic influenza as a potential global threat led to the
establishment of surveillance networks; multiple national andlive.co.uk (A.R. Cross).
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output of these networks was the One Health Initiative, founded in
2006 [7]. The concept of a One Health approach sees the health of
humans, animals and ecosystems as an interconnected network,
rather than problems to be tackled individually [1,7]. Key concepts
of One Health include: viewing the health of all species as needing
to be balanced; focusing on health assessment and disease pre-
vention rather than exclusively on treatment; and promoting a
strong collaborative between the human medicine and veterinary
sectors [7]. Under a single operative structure, the activities of both
public health and veterinary services, along with others by exten-
sion, can be focussed together. Employing an “ecosystem approach”
in a global context assists in mitigating health risks to both humans
and animals [8]. Indeed, employing a pragmatic, preventative One
Health approach to endemic zoonoses has been proposed to both
be more equitable and have more effective benefits, compared to
exclusively treating human cases of disease [9].
Here, we review key aspects of four bacterial zoonoses, all of
which have natural reservoirs or endemic areas across Europe.
Anthrax, brucellosis, tularaemia and Q fever are caused by Bacillus
anthracis, Brucella species, Francisella tularensis and Coxiella bur-
netii, respectively. These are all currently rare human diseases
(respectively causing approximately 2, 105, 155 and 230 cases per
100 million people per year in the European Union/European
Economic Area (EU/EEA), Fig. 1) [10,11]; however, sporadicour noses, Microbes and Infection (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/
Fig. 1. Reported cases of anthrax, brucellosis, tularaemia and Q fever in the EU/EEA between 2008e2016. A) Maps of the EU/EEA colour-coded by the total number of cases of
each zoonosis reported where data is available. Data on Q fever occurrence in Italy is not available for 2008e2015, therefore it is omitted here. B) Reported annual cases of
brucellosis, Q fever and tularaemia; Anthrax is omitted here due to the much smaller number of cases (on average fewer than 10 per year). Dataset provided by ECDC based on data
provided by WHO and Ministries of Health from the affected countries [10]. Figure generated using mapchart.net (https://mapchart.net/europe.html), GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1 and
gravit. io (https://gravit.io/).
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health, and animal industries. Common salient features of these
zoonoses are: each causes debilitating, potentially fatal disease in
both animals and humans; infectious doses are low (in some cases a
single bacterium [12]); and zoonotic transmission is a risk for those
working/living in proximity to animals, in addition to those
consuming untreated animal products [13e16]. Consequently, thePlease cite this article in press as: A.R. Cross, et al., Zoonoses under
j.micinf.2018.06.001bacteria that cause each of these zoonoses consistently appear on
select biological agent threat watch-lists across the globe
[13,17e19]. The principal routes of infection transmission and hu-
man risk groups for these diseases are summarised in Table 1.
Contamination of land is also of concern for these pathogens,
especially for C. burnetii and spores of B. anthraciswhich are highly
resilient to external environments [19,20].our noses, Microbes and Infection (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/
Table 1
Principal routes of transmission of bacterial zoonoses. Occupational exposure relates most specifically to veterinarians, farmworkers and abattoir workers. Wildlife leisure
refers to hunters/hikers.
Route of transmission People most at risk Prevention measures References
Consumption of contaminated
food or water
Consumers of meat/dairy products from
infected animals
Consume only pasteurised dairy products and meat form healthy
animals; drink only treated water
[13e16]
Exposure to animal fluids e.g.
urine/blood/faecal matter
Occupational/wildlife leisure Protective clothing, safe waste of disposal; decontamination of
exposed material and areas; store food away from rodents
[13,14,16,19]
Direct blood entry-mosquito/tick
bites or wound contamination
Occupational/wildlife leisure Cover wounds; use insect repellent [13,14,16,21,22]
Breathing in aerosolised bacteria Anyone in proximity to a contaminated area,
in addition to occupational/wildlife leisure
Surveillance by public health authorities; following confirmed
local outbreaks use appropriate PPE and seek medical advice
[13,14,16,23,24]
A.R. Cross et al. / Microbes and Infection xxx (2018) 1e10 3Data from the Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases, a tool
hosted at the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC), have been analysed for this review to discuss disease
occurrence and trends in select EU/EEA Member States over a
decade (2007e2016)1 [10]. This review discusses the European
disease trends and global context of each disease, along with the
characteristics of presentation and the medical interventions
available. One Health approaches to disease management are
highlighted, considering infection events in the context of
ecosystem health. A key benefit of this approach is the integrated
assessment of the interlinked challenges of food safety, global
health, antimicrobial resistance and biological security threats [7].
These four zoonoses highlight important One Health lessons, and
provide models of One Health principals in action, which can be
applied more broadly to global zoonoses.Fig. 2. Number of cases of anthrax reported each year in the EU/EEA. Data is shown
for every country with at least one case reported between 2007 and 2016. Peaks in
cases reported to the ECDC have been attributed to injectional anthrax, caused by the
use of contaminated heroin. 14 cases were reported to the ECDC in 2009 and 32 in
2010. It should be noted that there is a discrepancy between the ECDC data and
original literature reported in December 2011 for the injectional anthrax outbreak,
reflecting under-reporting by approximately 20% in the data shown here [37]. 2012
then saw a second episode of injectional anthrax cases in the UK and Germany again,
with an additional report in France and two in Denmark. Dataset provided by ECDC
based on data provided by WHO and Ministries of Health from the affected countries
[10]. Figure generated using GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1.2. Anthrax
Anthrax is caused by the soil-residing Bacillus genus. B. anthracis
is the main causative agent, however, recently characterised iso-
lates of Bacillus cereus from human infections have now been found
to possess anthrax-linked virulence factors [25]. B. anthracis is
known for its spore-forming ability, and the highly resilient nature
of these spores [13]. B. anthracis spores are resistant to temperature
extremes, drought and UV light, possibly due to protection of DNA
in a crystalline core [26]. This makes decontamination of material
and surfaces difficult.
Therewere on average fewer than ten human anthrax infections
per year in the EU/EEA between 2007 and 2016 (Figs.1B and 2) [10].
However, historically, anthrax was a relatively common disease
among humans and animals. In Victorian Britain, anthrax was
described as ‘woolsorters’ disease’; a disease experienced by wool-
workers that could be fatal in as little as 24e36 h [27]. The study of
woolsorters' disease identified B. anthracis as the causative agent,
capable of infection by inhalation. Consequently, control measures
such as fans and ventilation systems were implemented in factories
“so arranged as to carry the dust away from the worker” [28]. This
demonstrated an early awareness of the risk of inhaling contami-
nated aerosols in occupations where animal material is handled.
Most modern-day zoonotic incidences of anthrax in humans are
due to bacterial contamination of skin abrasions, causing cutaneous
anthrax. If diagnosed and treated appropriately this is rarely fatal,
and largely non-contagious. Without treatment, the bacteria can
disseminate to cause systemic infection, and mortality of inap-
propriately treated cutaneous anthrax is 20% [13]. However, in-
fections occurring through ingestion or inhalation of bacteria have
much higher mortality rates (25e100% for gastrointestinal anthrax,1 Data collected through The European Surveillance System (TESSy). Data is only
available for Croatia from 2012.
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transmission of anthrax has not been reported.
The level of treatment required depends on the severity of
infection and can range from oral antibiotics to intravenous anti-
biotics and surgery or amputation as appropriate. All cases of
inhalational anthrax require respiratory support in an intensive
care unit. In some cases, anti-toxin antibodies or vaccine doses can
be administered post-exposure [29,30]. The frontline drugs for
anthrax treatment are ciprofloxacin and doxycycline, which are
usually administered together [31]. Daptomycin, of the cyclic lip-
opeptide class of antibiotics, is being investigated for prophylactic/
post-exposure treatment of B. anthracis infection; results from
in vivo trials in non-human primates will confirm if this new class
of antibiotic will be effective [32].
One of the vaccines used routinely for livestock is the toxin-
producing, but non-capsule-forming Sterne strain vaccine. This
live-attenuated vaccine (LAV) still carries some virulence, particu-
larly in goats and llamas, where vaccine-associated mortality can
occur [33]. In addition to veterinary vaccines, there are several
options for human vaccines, offered to those with occupational
risks. The cell-free human vaccines Anthrax Vaccine Precipitated
(AVP) and Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA, also known asour noses, Microbes and Infection (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/
A.R. Cross et al. / Microbes and Infection xxx (2018) 1e104Biothrax™) are available in the UK and USA [34]. Both are derived
from sterile filtrate preparations of the Sterne strain. AVA has
recently been licensed for post-exposure prophylactic use by
applying the “Animal Rule” regulations of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) [30]. In addition to this, a live attenuated
Salmonella spp. expressing the anthrax antigen Ty21a-PA-01 is
currently being developed [35]. This aims to achieve a human
vaccine that is stable at room temperature, and can be administered
orally over a much-reduced immunisation period (approximately
seven days compared to 18 months with AVA). These features
would make this vaccine well-suited for use in response deliberate
release of the pathogen.
In addition to the principal routes of transmission highlighted in
Table 1, anthrax has also been found in cases of transmission linked
to illegal drug use [36]. The first cases of injectional anthrax were
documented in 2009 in heroin users in Scotland [37]. The outbreak
continued for one year, with fourteen fatalities recorded in Scot-
land, and further cases confirmed in England and Germany (Figs. 1B
and 2) [38]. A second outbreak of anthrax as a result of transmission
by injectionwas experienced by the UK and Germany in 2012, with
small numbers of cases additionally in Denmark and France [38]. It
was notable that the ECDC data showed fewer cases than were
reported retrospectively by Health Protection Scotland [10,37]. This
discrepancy highlights that data from collated international data-
bases should be interpreted as general trends, and that sources of
primary literature are required to verify the data. The source of
contamination was concluded to be from goat skins used to
transport the heroin [37]. The fact that the spores were able to
survive the drug preparation process highlights the extent of their
resilience to external stressors [36].
Attesting to the resilience of anthrax spores was an anthrax
outbreak in Italy in 2004, killing 124 grazing animals, that por-
trayed a particularly unusual pattern of transmission [39]. After the
removal of infected carcasses, which previously were left exposed
to insects and wild animals, the rate of fatalities decreased. This led
to the hypothesis that the pathogen was spread by flies, both
necrophilic and haematophagic [39]. Due to the highly resistant
nature of anthrax spores to low pH, insects that feed on infected
animals and carcasses are a possible vector for further trans-
mission. Some flying insects are able to transmit bacteria for at least
4 hours after contact with an infected animal, e.g. the house fly
Musca domestica [21].
When taking into account the injectional anthrax cases of
2009e2010 and 2012, it is clear that environmental transmission of
B. anthracis in the EU/EEA is low (Fig. 2). Bulgaria and Romania are
the only countries in this dataset which experience yearly cases due
to environmental exposure (on average one case per year for each).
Two events, in Romania and Bulgaria, were the result of the
slaughter and consumption of infected cattle [40,41]. In both
countries, the One Health approach to managing anthrax is adop-
ted. Such measures include robust reporting, rapid confirmation by
laboratory diagnostics, appropriate medical interventions, and
screening and prophylaxis where appropriate for those suspected
of exposure. Furthermore, for animals, quarantine, transport bans,
vaccination of local livestock and domestic pets, tracing and
destroying contaminated meat and animal products and disinfec-
tion of slaughter sites, processing factories and retail outlets are
enforced [40,41]. Part of the One Health strategy is also the
implementation of laws that prohibit the slaughter and consump-
tion of meat and animal products from sick animals to prevent
contaminated products entering the food chain [40].
Anthrax illustrates the One Health challenges of eradication of
robust environmental pathogens. Due to the resilience of bacterial
spores, the risk for environmental contamination from abandoned
animal carcases, or even soil-disturbance over historic animalPlease cite this article in press as: A.R. Cross, et al., Zoonoses under
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requiring removal of vegetation [20], is impractical. Restricting re-
emergence of veterinary and human disease requires vigilant sur-
veillance to rapidly identify cases; vaccination of local livestock to
prevent further disease; and swift disposal of infected animals/
carcasses to prevent contamination of the environment and vector
borne dispersal.
3. Brucellosis
Brucellosis is considered to be the most prevalent zoonosis
globally [43], yet is classed by the WHO as a ‘forgotten neglected
zoonosis’ [5]. Members of the Brucella genus are non-spore-
forming, Gram-negative bacteria. This genus consists of twelve
species, four of which (Bacillus melitensis, Bacillus abortus, Bacillus
suis and Bacillus canis) are relevant to human disease [44]. Themost
common routes of human infection are related to occupational
contact with animals, with transmission through inhalation of
aerosols and contact with animal secretions [14]. Consumption of
animal products can also lead to contraction of brucellosis [45,46].
Indeed, it was a link between disease sufferers consuming raw goat
milk, and later detection of B. melitensis in goat blood, that led to
the recognition of it as the causative agent of ‘Malta fever’ [45].
Humanehuman transmission of brucellosis is rare, but has been
documented [47].
As brucellosis is highly contagious between animals, can cause
disease by aerosol inhalation, and has a low infectious dose, species
of Brucella are commonly included on bioterrorismwatch lists [18].
Furthermore, although this genus of bacteria are non-spore-
forming, and less capable of survival in extreme environments
than B. anthracis, Brucella can persist formanyweeks inwet soil and
ambient-temperature farm slurry [14].
Brucellosis in humans, despite causing debilitating disease, is
rarely fatal. In 2013, out of 357 confirmed cases in the EU, 70%
required hospital treatment, but only one fatality was recorded
[48]. Symptoms in humans can reflect both acute, febrile illness and
chronic systemic disease, and there can be an incubation period of
up to six months before symptoms appear [31]. Treatment for
brucellosis requires a course of antibiotics for at least six weeks,
usually a doxycycline and rifampicin combination therapy [18]. In
animals, brucellosis symptoms include abortion, infertility,
decreased milk production, weight loss, and lameness [49], all of
which impact on the economics of farming. Although there are a
number of livestock vaccines available for Brucella species, none are
licensed for use in humans [44]. It is important for disease sur-
veillance and diagnosis to be able to distinguish between vacci-
nated and infected animals. The cattle vaccine B. abortus RB51 has a
rough phenotype which enables serological differentiation be-
tween vaccinated and diseased animals because animals vaccinated
with RB51 do not make antibodies against Brucella's lipopolysac-
charide [44]. However, the similar antibody profile generated in
vaccinated small ruminants (B. melitensis Rev. 1 vaccine) to that of
live Brucella exposure makes herd-surveillance for infection chal-
lengingwhere vaccination is common-place. Recently, new insights
into the specific antigenic structure of the bacterial cell wall O-
polysaccharide (OPS) have offered a resolution to this issue,
revealing potential for new diagnostic markers for herd surveil-
lance [49]. Additionally, OPS research is paving the way towards
development of a synthetic glycoconjugate vaccine for use in
humans and animals, which would be unreactive in serodiagnostic
tests [49].
Between 2007 and 2016 Greece reported the highest prevalence
of brucellosis in its population, with on average 12 in 100,000 in-
habitants contracting the disease annually (Fig. 3) [11]. This is un-
surprising as Greece also has the most abundant population ofour noses, Microbes and Infection (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/
Fig. 3. Number of cases of brucellosis reported each year in the EU/EEA. Data is
shown for every country with >50 total cases reported between 2007 and 2016. In
most European Member States, the notification of brucellosis in humans is mandatory.
The exceptions are the UK (where only animal infection is notifiable), Belgium, and
Denmark. Voluntary surveillance systems have full national coverage in the former
two, but in Denmark brucellosis remains non-notifiable, with no surveillance system in
place [48]. Brucellosis prevalence is highest in Italy and Greece; Italy consistently re-
ports the highest average cases per year, but Greece has the highest incidence in its
population, with on average 12 in 100,000 Greeks reporting a case of brucellosis each
year, four times more than Italians. Despite high incidence of brucellosis in Spain at the
start of Atlas data records, this has generally fallen from over 200 reported cases in
2007 to only 37 cases reported in 2016. Bulgaria had an outbreak in 2015 with 36 cases,
compared to the yearly average of just six. 2008 had the highest number of cases of
brucellosis across the EU/EEA between 2007 and 2016, with a total of 735 cases. This is
37% higher than the average total number of cases per year over that period. Dataset
provided by ECDC based on data provided by WHO and Ministries of Health from the
affected countries [10]. Figure generated using GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1.
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1975 with the vaccination of young sheep and goats, on both the
islands and mainland Greece [50]. A 2006 report from the UN
highlights difficulties in quantifying incidence in human cases [14].
Italy alone consistently reports the highest average cases per year in
countries reporting to the ECDC (Fig. 3). However, despite this it is
estimated that brucellosis could be over 20-fold under-reported
within the country [51].
In Bulgaria, after a period of 50 years free from brucellosis, the
disease has started to re-emerge [52] with the most recent
epidemic occurring in 2015 (Fig. 3). This was hypothesised to be the
result of unauthorised import of infected animals from neigh-
bouring endemic countries [46]. Cross-border transmission of
zoonoses threatens to re-instate endemicity in countries that had
previously been declared free of disease. France was declared offi-
cially free from bovine brucellosis according to the criteria of the
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) in 2005, yet through
human surveillance, re-emergence of the disease in cattle was
detected [53]. The specific risks of cross-border transmission of
brucellosis into Europe have been studied in the context of
transmission-risk from middle-eastern countries, where there are
some of the highest incidences of brucellosis in the world. Turkey
has more than 15,000 new cases per year [54], and Syria has an
incidence of >1000 in 100,000 [43]. In a recent case of brucellosis in
a Syrian refugee in Germany, one of the ‘lessons learnt’ was that
gaining a travel history from patients presenting with an undiag-
nosed ailment is of high import [55]. Molecular epidemiology
tracing B. melitensis in Germany to immigrants and German trav-
ellers identified similar concerns for correct identification of non-
endemic disease [54]. To better understand disease patterns andPlease cite this article in press as: A.R. Cross, et al., Zoonoses under
j.micinf.2018.06.001trends, and monitor outbreaks in real time, up to date mapping
approaches can be used that harness new computer technologies
[56]. This would rely on cooperative data exchange between
monitoring agencies. These observations highlight that threats
posed by biological agents are not confined by geographical bar-
riers or political boundaries. Brucellosis highlights the need for
non-endemic or “infection-free” countries to remain aware of the
risks of global zoonoses.
4. Tularaemia
Tularaemia is a zoonotic disease caused by F. tularensis. Although
there are four subspecies, only two are clinically relevant:
F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (type A) and F. tularensis subsp.
holarctica (type B). Whilst type A strains cause the most severe
disease, with an infectious dose of fewer than ten organisms, nat-
ural reservoirs are restricted to North America [15,57]. F. tularensis
subsp. holarctica is relevant in Europe, with prevalence across the
Northern hemisphere and an infectious dose of 10e50 bacteria
[15,31]. Clinical presentation of tularaemia in humans is highly
dependent on the route of transmission, in a similar manner to
cutaneous/gastrointestinal anthrax (Table 1). Ingestion of food or
water contaminated with F. tularensis causes oropharyngeal disease
[16]. Blood contact with infected animals from scratches/cuts or
insect bites more often results directly in glandular presentation,
causing swelling and ulcers. Finally, transmission through inhala-
tion of aerosols in contaminated dust leads to a pneumonic pre-
sentation [16]. The latter two modes have the highest risk of
environmental transmission for hunters and farmers. Pneumonic
tularaemia is also the most relevant disease presentation in the
context of bioterrorism [17]. The incubation period ranges from 1 to
14 days, and is generally 2e5 days [57]. Without treatment, both
glandular and oropharyngeal infections can persist for weeks or
months and may progress to the more serious and potentially fatal
pneumonic or septicaemic tularaemia [57].
As with inhalational anthrax, due to the potential severity of
symptoms and risk of mortality, a dual antibiotic approach is rec-
ommended for treatment of pneumonic tularaemia, for example
gentamicin and ciprofloxacin [31]. In 2013, information on the
outcome of confirmed tularaemia cases in Europe (covering almost
50% of reported cases) showed that approximately 52% of cases
required hospital treatment, however no deaths were reported
[48]. Due to the nature of the undulating fever associated with
tularaemia it is expected that the number of cases will be under-
reported [58]. No human vaccine for tularaemia is licenced yet in
the EU/EEA. A live vaccine strain (LVS) was produced in the Soviet
Union through serial passaging, from F. tularensis subsp. holarctica.
This has been in clinical trials, but currently safety and efficacy
concerns have prohibited licensure [57,59]. A modern LAV showing
promise is based on Francisella novicida, a bacterial species aviru-
lent in healthy humans [60]. Further to this, a new vaccine strategy
is also in development, employing a glycoconjugate subunit vac-
cine, in a similar approach to that being used for brucellosis [61].
Across all EU/EEA Member States, Sweden, Finland and Norway
had the highest reported prevalence of tularaemia in their pop-
ulations between 2008 and 2016 (Figs.1A and 4). Sweden alonewas
responsible for 43% of the average yearly cases of tularaemia in the
EU/EEA, with on average four in every 100,000 people reporting a
case each year [10,11]. F. tularensis subsp. holarctica is able to infect a
range of animal hosts: recently identified wild hosts include the red
fox (Vulpes vulpes), wild boar (Sus scrofa) and raccoon dog (Nyc-
tereutes procyonoides). However, most tularaemia surveillance in
European animals comes from recording dead/diseased farmed
rabbits/hares [16]. Infection of such forest mammals, and even fish,
with F. tularensis subsp. holarctica leads to a risk of zoonoticour noses, Microbes and Infection (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/
Fig. 4. Number of cases of tularaemia reported each year in the EU/EEA. Data is
shown for every country with >100 total cases reported between 2008 and 2016.
Human tularaemia is not a notifiable disease in Denmark, Portugal and Liechtenstein,
however, notification is mandatory in most EU/EEA member states [16] (Fig. 4). A
voluntary surveillance system is in place for Belgium and the United Kingdom [48].
Sweden reported the highest total number of cases, 3164, followed by Finland, Czech
Republic, Norway and Hungary. France, Germany, Spain and Slovakia experienced
much lower incidences, fewer than 1 in 100,000 cases reported each year on average.
2015 saw the highest number of reported cases of tularaemia over 2008e2016, with
64% of these occurring in Sweden. Sweden generally reported more cases each year
than any other country, except in 2009 when Finland saw twice its average yearly
cases, and in 2016 when Finnish cases reached a peak of 699, 3.6 times its yearly
average. In 2011 Norway also saw three times its average number of cases, affecting
almost 4 in every 100,000 people. In both 2010 and 2014 Hungary experienced out-
breaks, reporting 126 and 140 cases respectively, compared to the yearly average of 56.
Dataset provided by ECDC based on data provided by WHO and Ministries of Health
from the affected countries [10]. Figure generated using GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1.
A.R. Cross et al. / Microbes and Infection xxx (2018) 1e106transmission for any activities which involve contact with wildlife
in endemic areas, most notably hunting (Table 1) [62]. The peaks of
tularaemia outbreaks in the EU occur over the end of the summer,
coinciding with the peak in mosquito populations [16]. It is there-
fore widely accepted that mosquitos are responsible for the trans-
mission of F. tularensis subsp. holarctica between animals, and to
humans (Table 1). A single contaminated water source can lead to
mosquito-borne transmission of tularaemia [15,22]. Furthermore,
as the taiga forest covers the three European countries with highest
reported prevalence of tularaemia, it is not surprising that they
share natural sources for infection. Therefore, the relationship be-
tween humans and animals with parasites and vectors plays a key
role in the spread of infection [63].
The survival and propagation of F. tularensis subsp. holarctica in
natural fresh and brackish water has been well studied, however,
there have been fewer studies on the environmental survival of
F. tularensis subsp. tularensis [15,62]. An unusual outbreak of
tularaemia on an island off the coast of Cape Cod, USA led to
establishing that F. tularensis subsp. tularensis can indeed survive in
brackish water [64]. This outbreak on Martha's Vineyard, spanning
from 2000 to 2008, was unusual due to the skew of disease pre-
sentation to pneumonic, rather than the glandular presentation
associated with bites from parasites, and contamination of skin
wounds [23]. Two thirds of the 90 reported cases displayed pneu-
monic symptoms. The observation of pneumonic presentation led
to investigations to track the source of infection, to ensure that this
was a natural event and not bioterrorism [17]. However, no envi-
ronmental samples were positive for either of the disease-causing
species of F. tularensis [23,64]. It remains unknown what the true
reservoir for F. tularensis subsp. tularensis is on Martha's Vineyard;
without definition of this, intervention methods are limited.
However, links have been made with landscaping activitiesPlease cite this article in press as: A.R. Cross, et al., Zoonoses under
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sonal protective equipment, e.g. masks [23].
The management of tularaemia outbreaks highlights the need
for human, animal and whole ecosystem surveillance systems to
achieve an efficient One Health approach [6,7,58]. Understanding
the source of infection is important for deployment of the most
effective response to minimise disease. For example, if a parasite/
rodent source is suspected, methods for pest control would be
advised, however, if the source was a water system then disease
management should focus on personal protection, for example
vaccination [65]. In addition to the need of vaccines for ecosystem
health in endemic areas, vaccine development strategies are also
important to address F. tularensis as a potential bioterror agent [17].
5. Q fever
Query fever, or Q fever as it is more commonly known, is the
zoonosis caused by C. burnetii, an obligate intracellular bacterium
that is globally prevalent (except in New Zealand) [66]. C. burnetii,
similar to F. tularensis, infects a wide range of species, including
terrestrial mammals such as cats and dogs, and even aquatic
mammals [66,67]. However, Q fever is of particular economic sig-
nificance in ruminants, such as cows, sheep and goats [68]. In such
animals, symptoms are similar to those of brucellosis, with spon-
taneous abortion of pregnancies being the main clinical symptom.
Again, this causes a substantial economic impact for animal in-
dustries [68]. The material shed from animal infections (e.g. abor-
tive material, milk, faeces and urine) contaminates dirt and dust in
the environment with C. burnetii. Here, C. burnetii cells adapt to the
harsh environment outside of a host by adopting a highly resilient
spore-like state [66]. These highly resistant cells behave similarly to
anthrax spores, remaining viable for years and easily becoming
aerosolised in wind, for example in dust clouds, where they can
spread to new areas and infect new hosts [69].
Inhalation of bacteria is the most common route of Q fever
transmission to humans. As few as 1e10 aerosolised C. burnetii cells
can result in zoonotic transmission, therefore occupation is a key
risk-factor for disease; individuals at highest risk of Q fever expo-
sure are farmers, abattoir workers and vets [12,70]. In Australia,
prior to an increase in Q-fever vaccination as many as 60% of meat
and agricultural workers were seropositive after 25 years in the
industry [70]. In addition to occupational risks, the presence of
C. burnetii in ruminant milk, as with Brucella, also poses a risk for
disease transmission [71e74] (Table 1). Humans generally present
with acute infections, causing symptoms of an undifferentiated
febrile illness after an incubation period of 2e40 days (most
commonly 18e21 days) [31,75]. However, patients can develop life-
changing complications from persistent focalised infections, such
as hepatitis, chronic fatigue, and endocarditis [76]. A quick and
accurate diagnosis for Q fever is important as although little is
known about the development of persistent infections, and posteQ
fever fatigue, the severity of the initial infection is a known risk
factor [66]. Doxycycline, often administered as a monotherapy, is
the primary antibiotic used in the treatment of acute Q fever in
humans, and swift administration should minimise complications
[31,66]. For animals, a whole-cell inactivated vaccine, Coxevac, can
be used to prevent infection, and has been shown to reduce
shedding of bacteria when applied in combination with antibiotic
therapy for dairy herds already affected by Q fever [77]. While a
similar formalin-inactivated whole-cell vaccine is available for
human use in Australia, there is currently no Q fever vaccine
licensed in the UK/EU/US, but research programs are on-going [78].
Between 2007 and 2010 the Netherlands experienced the
biggest Q fever epidemic in recorded history (Fig. 5). Over 4000
human cases were confirmed during this outbreak; additionally,our noses, Microbes and Infection (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/
Fig. 5. Number of cases of Q fever reported each year in the EU/EEA. Data is shown
for every country with >125 total cases reported between 2008 and 2016. The
2007e2010 Q fever epidemic was contained within southern areas of the Netherlands,
affecting small ruminant farms in the direction of the prevailing wind from the
affected goat farms. This accounted for 37% of the total cases of Q fever in the EU/EEA
between 2008 and 2016, with on average 1300 cases reported per year. After this was
resolved, the country with the highest prevalence of Q fever was Germany, with on
average 240 cases/year between 2011 and 2016 (incidence of 2 in 100,000), followed
by France, Spain and Hungary, with 180, 110 and 60 cases/year, respectively. In the six
years following the epidemic resolution, the Netherlands experienced a much-reduced
average of 37 cases reported per year. Additionally, in 2013 Hungary experienced an
epidemic of 135 cases, this was resolved within two years. Dataset provided by ECDC
based on data provided by WHO and Ministries of Health from the affected countries
[10]. Figure generated using GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1.
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ulation-based serological survey later confirmed that airborne
bacteria carried on the wind from infected goat farms were
responsible for zoonotic transmission [69]. Real-time PCR for
acute-phase diagnostics was pivotal to the outbreak assessment,
contributing to the ability to confirm a Q fever diagnosis in cases
where serology was inconclusive [80]. Directly following the
outbreak only six fatalities were reported but by May 2016 the
death toll had risen to 74 [81]. The rise to 74 by 2016 reflects that Q
fever infections can remain dormant, with persistent focalised
infections causing symptoms long after exposure [76,82]. As a
result of the epidemic, seroprevalence to C. burnetii antibodies in
the general population of the Netherlands rose from 2.4% in 2006
to 6.1% in 2015 [69]. One key output of the Netherlands epidemic
was the establishment of a national zoonosis structure with a
monthly signalling forum [68].
In the Netherlands, as a response to the large epidemic, gov-
ernmentmeasures were put in place to vaccinate all dairy goats and
sheep, and to test and cull pregnant animals testing positive for
C. burnetii. One of the methods for detection was the presence or
absence of C. burnetii DNA in bulk tank milk (BTM) tested by PCR
[72]. However, up to nine days after immunisation, vaccine-derived
C. burnetii DNA can be detected in the milk of dairy goats which
have not had live pathogen exposure. Consequently, a two-week
post-vaccination interval was introduced to the test-and-cull con-
trol measures, in order to avoid unnecessary culling due to vaccine-
derived false-positive detection [71].
Globally, the proportion of community-acquired pneumonia
related to acute Q fever is highest in French Guiana [83], followed
by Canada, Northern Spain, Croatia and the Netherlands [66]. In
Cayenne, French Guiana, Q fever is a hyperendemic disease, with
the incidence of cases in 2005 reaching 150 cases per 100,000 in-
habitants [84]. A retrospective cohort study recently linked two
independent risk factors to a 2013 epidemic in Cayenne: cleaningPlease cite this article in press as: A.R. Cross, et al., Zoonoses under
j.micinf.2018.06.001the house; and carrying a three-toed sloth. Both of these activities
correlate to inhalational disease acquisition [85].
In 2013, Hungary experienced a Q fever outbreak, albeit on a
smaller scale (Fig. 5). The source of this epidemic was tracked to a
flock of Merino sheep, where, as with the previous Netherlands
epidemic, dried contaminated material was carried by the wind
causing human infections by inhalation [86]. The epidemic was
resolved after all manure from the infected farm was eliminated
and the farm disinfected. Furthermore, for the management of
C. burnetii infection spread within a herd, good farm practices such
as regular litter-cleaning have been recommended as simple
measures prior to whole-farm disinfection [87].
Generally, Q fever infection in humans is controllable by good
hygiene practices when dealing with animals, particularly rumi-
nants. From a One Health perspective, Q fever represents one
example of a wide range of conditions that cause febrile disease.
Rapid diagnostics that can differentiate these (often rare) under-
lying diseases offer the opportunity to avoid unnecessary antimi-
crobial use and to take early, specific actions to prevent
development of disease [24,80]. Surveillance of enzootic pathogens
using seroprevalence in livestock assists in informing the risk of
transmission of zoonoses to humans.
6. Conclusions
Bacterial zoonoses are often omitted from discussions on pri-
ority global pathogens. Nevertheless, while natural reservoirs for
disease remain, they retain relevance to acheiving success in One
Health approaches worldwide [9]. Anthrax is enzootic to Eastern
Europe, with consistent yearly cases of zoonotic transmission in
Bulgaria and Romania (Fig. 2) [10]. While brucellosis eradication
programmes are being employed across Europe, the disease re-
mains endemic in both Greece and Italy [50,51]. However, the main
threat for brucellosis re-emergence in Europe arises from countries
such as Syria, which has an incidence 100-times greater than that of
endemic European countries [43]. Sweden has the highest endemic
prevalence of F. tularensis subsp. holarctica, with 43% of tularaemia
cases reported to the ECDC occurring there. For a zoonosis like this,
where >50% of cases can require hospital treatment, applying One
Health control and preventionmeasures in an eco-system approach
offers an attractive model for lessening the economic burden of
disease [9]. Whilst endemic globally, it was the Q fever epidemic
experienced by the Netherlands that drew global attention to the
disease [79]. The networks in place for a One Health approach to
endemic disease management apply also in response to epidemics
[88]; analysis here shows that 67% of all Q fever cases reported to
the ECDC between 2008 and 2010 occurred in the Netherlands (the
latter three years of the 2007e2010 epidemic) (Fig. 5) [10]. How-
ever, in the six years following, only 5% of the total cases across the
EU/EEA were of Dutch origin, showing an effectively maintained
response.
One Health intervention methods include surveillance, medical
interventions (post-exposure therapeutics and prophylactic vac-
cines), and sanitation. The case for employing One Health initia-
tives, and engaging communities to partake in them, clearly
highlights the potential for much improved efficacy, and more
equitable health and livelihood benefits [9]. In addition to moni-
toring and controlling endemic disease epidemics, it is also
important to keep the global conversation updated on bacterial
zoonoses due to the potential threat of their malicious misuse.
Surveillance requires accurate and reliable reporting mecha-
nisms, so that appropriate points for intervention can be recognised
[88]. Maintaining reliable information on international prevalence
(both human and animal), and detailed case histories for infection
incidence is paramount to One Health. These will include nationalour noses, Microbes and Infection (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/
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in the Netherlands [68]. International tools for collating data, such
as The ECDC Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases [10], offer a
broader perspective and information for professionals in all sectors
working towards One Health.
Diagnostics play a key role in disease surveillance. Misdiagnosis
results in inappropriate treatment, or missed opportunities to
prevent further disease transmission. The zoonoses discussed here
often present as undifferentiated febrile illnesses, and so a detailed
history is key to diagnosis. More common ailments with similar
symptoms will be initially suspected, and diagnosis may be missed
altogether in self-limiting cases. While algorithm tools for disease
diagnosis and management have been developed to aid medical
professionals in diagnosis of zoonoses [89], there is a clear need for
accurate and sensitive point-of-care diagnostic tests [9]. Emerging
technologies such as high throughput sequencing and semi-
conductor genome analysis offer the potential for diagnosis within
hours [90]. This will be of particular benefit for zoonoses where
development to persistent or chronic disease is a risk [57,76].
Medical interventions, including post-exposure therapeutics
such as antibiotics, are essential especially for human treatment
[31]. For diseased animals, post-exposure therapy is often not a
viable approach due to the associated costs, risk of further trans-
mission, and virulence of these infections potentially causing death
before culling. Instead, One Health necessitates a focus on pre-
vention, and requires cheap, effective and readily deployable pro-
phylaxis methods, such as veterinary and human vaccines [9].
Current vaccine research directives are progressing away from LAVs
or whole cell killed vaccines. Such approaches are using reverse
vaccinology, subunit vaccines and conjugate vaccines (e.g. the Sal-
monella-Ty21a-PA-01 anthrax toxin conjugate vaccine, glyco-
conjugate vaccines for brucellosis and tularaemia, and epitope-
selected subunit vaccines for Q fever [35,49,61,78]). These mini-
mise safety risks (such as potential animal toxicity of the anthrax
Sterne strain vaccine) and enable more effective herd surveillance
methods. The prospect of room-temperature-stable vaccines (e.g.
anthrax toxin-conjugate vaccine [35]) offers advantages for public
health and veterinary preparedness, as well as outbreak and bio-
terrorism management.
Sanitation, such as basic infection control measures, should be
practiced in areas of endemic zoonoses. This includes vaccination
where appropriate, good hygiene practices and the use of appro-
priate personal protective equipment (especially where exposure
to aerosols is a risk) [23,24]. In Australia, it is recommended that
clothing potentially contaminated with C. burnetii should not be
washed in the presence of un-vaccinated individuals [24]. Farm
sanitation is also important, as shown for Brucella which can sur-
vive in farm slurry [14], and the recommendation for regular
cleaning and incineration of litter to prevent the spread of Q fever
in a herd [87].
Bioterror classifications set by the United States Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (U.S. CDC) classify anthrax and
tularaemia as Category A agents, the highest priority [91]. This is
due to their transmissibility, potential for high mortality, potential
for major impact to public health, potential to cause public panic
and social disruption, and the requirement of special action for
public health preparedness. Brucellosis and Q fever appear in
Category B where, despite high infectiousness, mortality rates are
lower [91]. One key aspect to disease threat categorisation is
whether the disease exists naturally or is endemic. For example, in
the UK, any confirmed case of a non-endemic biothreat should be
assumed to be the result of a deliberate release until proven
otherwise [31]. This is the case for pulmonary anthrax and tular-
aemia, in addition to other zoonoses such as smallpox, plague,
glanders, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) and viralPlease cite this article in press as: A.R. Cross, et al., Zoonoses under
j.micinf.2018.06.001haemorrhagic fever (VHF). Appreciation of an area's endemic
pathogens, in the context of global distribution, is therefore of
considerable importance to threat assessment [88]. Anthrax is
possibly the most high-profile modern biological threat agent, due
to its weaponization and use in the late 20th century, most notably
the intentional contamination of postal letters in 2001, resulting in
five mortalities [92]. There has been speculative evidence of
C. burnetii used maliciously in Europe in the past, including an
outbreak of Q fever among army troops during World War II [19].
Indeed, F. tularensis was also suspected to have been deployed
maliciously during World War II [17]. Used as weapons, Brucella
species (notably B. suis), F. tularensis subsp. holarctica and C. burnetii
would have lowmortality rates, but carry the potential to debilitate
large numbers of people and animals, contaminate the environ-
ment, and disrupt animal industries [19,93].
While transmission of zoonotic disease in the EU/EEA is most
relevant to those with occupational health risks, global threats to
human, animal and environmental health security do remain from
cross-border transmission, environmentally resilient pathogens
and the potential for biological agent weaponization. The most
poignant risks to global health is the lack of disease awareness and
ignorance of the interlinked connections between global health,
food safety, antimicrobial resistance and biological security threats.
Thus, employing a One Health approach is vital, and local and in-
ternational information-sharing on surveillance, control and pre-
vention measures is of the utmost importance to enabling One
Health for all zoonoses.Conflict of interest
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